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Stimuli can be rendered invisible using a variety of methods and the method selected to
demonstrate unconscious processing in a given study often appears to be arbitrary. Here,
we compared unconscious processing under continuous ﬂash suppression (CFS) andmeta-
contrast masking, using similar stimuli, tasks and measures. Participants were presented
with a prime arrow followed by a target arrow. They made a speeded response to the
target arrow direction and then reported on the prime’s visibility. Perception of the prime
was made liminal using either meta-contrast masking (Experiment 1) or CFS (Experiments
2 and 3). Conscious perception of the prime was assessed using a sensitive visibility scale
ranging from 0 to 3 and unconscious processing was measured as the priming effect
on target discrimination performance of prime-target direction congruency when prime
visibility was null. Crucially, in order to ensure that the critical stimuli were equally distant
from the limen of consciousness, we sought stimulus and temporal parameters for which
the proportion of 0-visibility trials was comparable for the two methods. We found that
the method used to prevent conscious perception matters: unconscious processing was
substantial with meta-contrast masking but absent with CFS. These ﬁndings suggest that
CFS allows very little perceptual processing, if at all, and that previous reports of high-level
and complex unconscious processing during CFS may result from partial awareness.
Keywords: conscious perception, unconscious perception, subliminal processing, meta-contrast masking,
continuous flash suppression, response priming, awareness, consciousness
INTRODUCTION
Visual consciousness has been the focus of intense research in the
last two decades (Marcel, 1983; Erdelyi, 1986, 2004; Greenwald
et al., 1996; Vorberg et al., 2003; Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004;
Lau and Passingham, 2006; Schmidt and Vorberg, 2006; Lamy
et al., 2009; Sandberg et al., 2010). The search for the limits of
unconscious processing lies at the heart of this research: which
processes can unfold in the absence of conscious perception and
conversely, for which processes is consciousness essential? In other
words, what is the function of consciousness? The most widely
used empirical strategy used to address this question is to probe
the inﬂuence on behavior of stimuli that are barred fromconscious
access, so as to assess what processes can be performed outside
perceptual awareness.
A rather large arsenal of paradigms stand at disposal to prevent
a visual stimulus from entering consciousness: pattern masking
(e.g., Breitmeyer and Ganz, 1976), meta-contrast masking (Breit-
meyer, 1978), object-substitution masking (Di Lollo et al., 2000),
continuous ﬂash suppression (CFS; Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005), the
attentional blink (Raymond et al., 1992), inattentional blindness
(Mack and Rock, 1998), and more (see Kim and Blake, 2005 for a
review). The choice of the paradigm used to demonstrate uncon-
scious processing often appears to be arbitrary, despite the fact
that the different paradigms are known to affect perceptual pro-
cessing in qualitatively different ways (e.g., Enns, 2004; Almeida
et al., 2010; Kanai et al., 2010; Faivre et al., 2012; Fogelson et al.,
2014). On the one hand, one could claim that the method used to
prevent conscious perception should not matter as long as uncon-
scious perception is demonstrated. On the other hand, however,
it is important to minimize failures to identify processes that can
be performed without consciousness. To do that, targeting the
procedures that obliterate conscious processing while most min-
imally impairing unconscious processing would seem to be the
most judicious strategy. To illustrate this point bluntly, blindfold-
ing observers to prevent conscious perception would be a bad
choice because it would also thoroughly eliminate unconscious
processing.
In the present paper, we focused on a paradigm that has become
increasingly popular in consciousness research: CFS (henceforth,
CFS, Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005), and investigated the extent to
which it disrupts unconscious processing. With this method,
arrays of randomly generated shapes of different colors (Mon-
drians) presented successively at ∼10 Hz to one eye can reliably
suppress the conscious awareness of an image presented to the
other eye. One of the main reasons for the enthusiasm surround-
ing CFS is that, unlike backward masking, which is effective only
when the target is presented very brieﬂy (typically for less that
100 ms), CFS-induced suppression can last very long, on the order
of seconds (Shimaoka and Kaneko, 2011; Stein et al., 2011). Based
on the premise that high-level computations may require relatively
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long processing times, CFS should be a particularly well-suited
paradigm in order to measure high-level unconscious processing.
Consistent with this conjecture, several studies relying on
breaking suppression duringCFS have revealed that we are capable
of performing complex, high-level cognitive operations with-
out conscious perception (e.g., Jiang et al., 2006; Costello et al.,
2009; Mudrik et al., 2011; Sklar et al., 2012; Lupyan and Ward,
2013). In a nutshell, the rationale underlying the use of break-
ing suppression is that if a stimulus is found to overcome (or
break) suppression earlier than another stimulus, then one can
conclude that the property on which the two stimuli differ was
processed unconsciously. However, there has been no convinc-
ing evidence that differences in breaking suppression times reﬂect
genuine unconscious processing rather than processing under
partial consciousness (e.g., Stein et al., 2011; see Gayet et al.,
2014).
Other CFS studies that either used a traditional dissociation
procedure or examined the neural consequences of this method
have generated conﬂicting ﬁndings as to whether CFS interferes
with low-level or with high-level cognitive processing (see Sterzer
et al., 2014 for a review). For instance, some authors showed that
subliminal stimuli suppressed using CFS elicit semantic process-
ing (e.g., Almeida et al., 2008, 2010; Bahrami et al., 2010), while
others showed that CFS-suppressed stimuli undergo only low-
level perceptual processing (e.g., Faivre et al., 2012). Likewise,
while several functional MRI studies showed robust suppres-
sion of activity in higher visual areas during CFS (e.g., Fang
and He, 2005; Jiang et al., 2006; Hesselmann and Malach, 2011)
but not in the primary visual cortex (Watanabe et al., 2011),
Yuval-Greenberg and Heeger (2013) recently showed that CFS
does in fact modulate fMRI responses in the primary visual cor-
tex (see also Kang et al., 2011 for consistent ﬁndings using ERP
methodology).
Most crucially, however, the very few studies that directly
compared the extent of unconscious processing when stimuli
are rendered invisible using CFS vs. other methods, suggest
that CFS has the lower hand: it actually elicits more restricted
unconscious processing (Almeida et al., 2010; Faivre et al., 2012,
2014; Izatt et al., 2014). For instance, Faivre et al. (2012) showed
that while emotional face primes biased subsequent preference
judgments when suppressed from awareness by gaze-contingent
crowding, they did not elicit such emotion-related processing
when suppressed by backward masking or CFS. Instead, they
only produced an effect akin to low-level perceptual adaptation:
responses to a face target were slower following an identical sup-
pressed prime face relative to a suppressed face conveying the
same emotional expression but displayed by a different individual.
In addition, Almeida et al. (2010) showed that backward-masked
primes elicited category- and identity-speciﬁc priming both with
tool andwith animal stimuli,whereasCFS-suppressedprimeswere
associated only with small category-speciﬁc priming, and only
with tool stimuli.
The foregoing studies relied on an objective measure of con-
scious perception to ensure that the prime was subliminal (but
Izatt et al., 2014 used also a subjective measure). Speciﬁcally, using
an experimental strategy that has become standard in the study
of unconscious processing (Dehaene et al., 1998; Ansorge et al.,
2009; Hsieh et al., 2011; Van Opstal et al., 2011) they included
experimental trials inwhich the inﬂuence of a subliminal prime on
responses to a subsequent target was probed, and prime-awareness
test trials inwhich chance performance at judging the critical prop-
erty of the prime was demonstrated. Thus, for instance, Almeida
et al. (2010) showed that a suppressed prime facilitated response to
a categorically congruent target, yet performance at discriminating
the category to which this prime belonged was at chance.
It is important to note that with objective measures of con-
scious perception, it is of tantamount importance to select stimuli
that cannot be discriminated above chance: just a few visible trials
can jeopardize the success of the whole experiment (e.g., Rouder
et al., 2013). Thus, the safest strategy is to select deeply sublim-
inal stimuli at the risk of “overshooting,” that is, of cutting into
unconscious processing itself. However, the magnitude of such
overshooting cannot be assessed because performance is undis-
criminably at chance whether the critical stimulus is just under
the limen or completely hidden from view (see Figure 1). As a
consequence, ﬁnding that unconscious processing occurs using
one method but not using another, may not necessarily reﬂect that
these methods constitutively disrupt different stages of process-
ing: instead, it might simply indicate that the stimulus parameters
selected to ensure chance objective performance pushed percep-
tual processing further from the limen with one method relative
to the other.
The objective of the present research was to assess the extent
of unconscious processing using liminal stimuli instead of sub-
liminal stimuli. We compared CFS with meta-contrast masking,
a method that is thought to interfere with perceptual processing
at a relatively late stage (e.g., Del Cul et al., 2007; Enns, 2004) and
has been associated with robust priming (e.g., Vorberg et al., 2003;
Kentridge et al., 2008; Peremen and Lamy, 2014). We assessed con-
scious perception of the prime using a sensitive subjective visibility
scale akin to the Perceptual Awareness Scale (e.g., Ramsøy and
Overgaard, 2004)1. One of the main advantages of using this mea-
sure in the present context is that it allows using liminal stimuli,
that is, stimuli that are subjectively invisible on some proportion
of the trials and perceived at various degrees of clarity on other
trials. In this way, one can prevent conscious processing while
minimally encroaching on unconscious processing. In addition to
minimizing the distance of the critical stimulus perception from
the limen of consciousness, visibility scales allow one to measure
this distance – a feature that is particular useful when comparing
1Subjective measures of conscious perception have been criticized, based on the
claim that they may be contaminated by responses biases – a problem that is often
referred to as the criterion problem (e.g., Eriksen, 1960; Holender, 1986). However,
recent research suggests that using a sensitive subjective measure may circumvent
this problem. In a recent study (Peremen and Lamy, 2014) we used meta-contrast
masking to manipulate conscious perception of a prime arrow pointing either to
the left or to the right and measured conscious perception using a 0-to-3 subjective
visibility scale. On trials in which the prime arrow was rated to be completely
invisible (rating 0), objective performance at discriminating its direction fell to
chance. By contrast, a rating of 1, indicating very faint visibility of the prime, was
associatedwith above-chance performance. Focused scrutiny of the literature reveals
that chance forced-choice performance at discriminating a simple feature of a target
rendered invisible by a variety of methods, is not uncommon (e.g., Wyart and
Tallon-Baudry, 2008; Bahrami et al., 2010). Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest
that subjective reports of conscious perception can be as sensitive asmeasures relying
on objective discrimination performance.
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the ideas that (1) to maximize sensitivity for measuring unconscious processing, the critical stimulus must be as close as
possible to the limen of consciousness and (2) chance performance at discriminating the critical stimulus is not informative with regard to this
stimulus’ distance from the limen of consciousness.
different methods for preventing conscious perception: similar
proportions of invisible trials should indicate similar distances
from the limen.
In the present study, we compared the extent of unconscious
processing of a prime arrow direction when this arrow was ren-
dered invisible using meta-contrast masking (Experiment 1)2, or
CFS (Experiments 2 and 3). In all three experiments, participants
were presented with a liminal prime arrow followed by a clearly
visible target arrow, the direction of which was either congruent or
incongruent with the prime arrow direction. On each trial, partic-
ipants ﬁrst made a speeded forced-choice discrimination response
to the direction of the target arrow and then rated the visibility of
the prime on a scale ranging from 0 to 3. Unconscious processing
of the prime arrow direction was measured as the performance
difference between the congruent and incongruent conditions on
trials in which participants reported their subjective visibility of
the prime to be null.
EXPERIMENT 1
METHODS
Participants
Twenty two right-handed undergraduate students from Tel Aviv
University (13 women), age 22–28 years (M = 24.9, SD = 1.9)
were tested in one session for course credit. All subjects reported
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
2This experiment was reported in a previous paper (Peremen and Lamy, 2014,
Experiment 2) to address a different question. Speciﬁcally, while in that paper
the emphasis was on the comparison between subjective and objective measures
of conscious perception, the emphasis here is on the comparison of unconscious
processing during meta-contrast masking and continuous ﬂash suppression.
Apparatus and stimuli
Sample displays are presented in Figure 2. The stimuli were pre-
sented on a 17-inch 85-Hz CRT monitor. The ﬁxation display
consisted of a plus sign (0.2◦× 0.2◦ of visual angle). The prime
display consisted of a small arrow (1.6◦× 0.8◦) and the target-
mask display consisted of a larger arrow, 2.1◦ in width and 1.1◦ in
height. Both arrows were gray (RGB 127, 127, 119) against a black
background (RGB 0, 0, 0), were centered at ﬁxation and pointed
either leftward or rightward. Thus, the prime arrow either pointed
in the same direction as the target arrow (congruent trials) or in
the opposite direction (incongruent trials).
Procedure and design
Each trial began with a 500-ms presentation of the ﬁxation dis-
play. The prime display then appeared for 24 ms, followed after
a variable SOA (0, 24, 47, 71, 94, or 118 ms) by the target-mask
display. Then, a blank screen appeared until subjects provided the
ﬁrst response or after 2,000 ms had elapsed, followed by a question
mark in the middle of the screen, which prompted the subjects to
provide the second response. A new trial began immediately after
second response.
On each trial, subjects provided two responses: they ﬁrst made
a speeded response to the target-mask arrow direction by pressing
designated keys as fast as possible on the numerical keypad with
their right hands (“1” when the arrow pointed to the left and “3”
when it pointed to the right). Then, they provided a subjective
report of the prime visibility using a scale ranging from 0 (“I
saw nothing at all”) to 3 (“I saw the arrow clearly”) by pressing
designated keys (“z,” “x,” “c,” and “v” which were covered with
stickers labeled 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively) on the keyboard with
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FIGURE 2 | Sequence of events in Experiment 1. In this example, the
directions of the prime and target arrows are congruent. Participants were
required to make a speeded response to the target mask arrow direction
(left or right) and then rate subjective visibility of the prime.
their left hands. Five percent of the trialswere catch trials: the target
was presented alone, without a prime. The purpose of introducing
catch trials was to anchor 0-visibility judgments to situations in
which no prime appeared. On 10% of the trials (no-go trials) the
target arrowheads were truncated and observers had to press the
space-bar instead of providing the two responses pertaining to
the prime3. Each subject completed 500 trials divided into ten
blocks and following two practice blocks of 50 trials each. Before
practice, the observers viewed the sequence of events at a very slow
pace that enabled them to clearly distinguish between the prime
and target.
All combinations of the prime and target arrow directions
were equiprobable and randomly mixed. They were equally likely
to be congruent or incongruent. Prime-to-target SOAs were
equiprobable and randomly mixed.
RESULTS
The data from two participants were excluded from analysis: one
because his mean RTs were slower than the group’s by more than
3 SDs and the other, because of a technical error. Prime-absent
(or catch) trials as well as no-go trials were excluded from all
analyses. In all RT analyses, trials in which responses to the tar-
get direction were inaccurate were excluded (2.3%) and so were
trials in which the RT exceeded the mean of its cell (resulting
from crossing the factors included in the relevant analysis) by
more than 2.5 SDs (fewer than 1% of the trials). An ANOVA
with SOA as a within-subject factor and mean visibility as the
dependent measure revealed that mean visibility followed the
3The use of a go no-go task is related to the goals of Peremen and Lamy (2014) study
and is irrelevant here. It will therefore not be considered further.
U-shaped pattern characteristic of type-B meta-contrast mask-
ing (Kolers and Rosner, 1960) and was lowest at the 47-ms SOA
(this trend did not reach signiﬁcance after Huynh–Feldt correc-
tion, F(5,75) = 2.69, p< 0.09). The mean proportion of trials per
visibility for each SOA is shown in Figure 34.
Reaction times
A linear mixed-effects model with visibility (0, 1, 2, or 3) and
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) as within-subject factors
was performed on the mean RTs. Mean RT and accuracy data
are presented in Table 1 and the mean congruency effect at each
visibility level is shown in Figure 45. The main effect of congru-
ency was signiﬁcant, F(1,19) = 86.94, p < 0.0001, with faster RTs
when the prime and target arrows were congruent than when they
were incongruent. The main effect of visibility was also signiﬁ-
cant, F(3,53) = 32.16, p < 0.0001, with longer RTs as visibility
increased. The interaction between the two factors was signiﬁcant,
F(3,53) = 3.7, p< 0.02. Further analyses revealed that the congru-
ency effect was larger for visibility three than for all other levels,
all ps > 0.03 and that the congruency effects for visibility levels 0,
1, and 2 did not differ from each other, all Fs < 1. Crucially, the
congruency effect was signiﬁcant when visibility was null, 49 ms
F(1,53) = 14.82, p < 0.001.
Accuracy
Similar analyses were conducted on the accuracy data pertain-
ing to the responses to the target arrow. They showed similar
trends, thus ensuring that speed-accuracy trade-off was not a con-
cern. The main effect of visibility was signiﬁcant, F(3,53) = 6.81,
p< 0.001, the main effect of congruency approached signiﬁcance
F(1,19) = 3.75, p < 0.07 and the interaction between the two
factors was not signiﬁcant, F < 1.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHODS
Participants
Fifteen undergraduate students fromTel AvivUniversity (fourteen
right-handed, 11 women,), age 20–27 years (M = 23, SD = 1.65)
were tested in one session for course credit. All subjects reported
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus, stimuli, procedure, and design
The apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1 except for the
following changes. All stimuli were presented on a LCD monitor
(SyncMaster) with 1920 × 1080 resolution, 120 Hz refresh rate
4The distribution of visibility ratings could considerably vary between observers.
However, we chose not to exclude subjects based on considerations of balanced
visibility rating distribution. Instead, in order to overcome the distortions that
might result from unbalanced repeated measures data, we used a mixed effects
model to analyze the data when visibility was as a factor. Importantly, however, for
this and the following experiments, the results remained the same when subjects
with unbalanced distributions (fewer than 10% or more than 65% of 0-visibility
trials) were excluded.
5The relatively high mean RT in this and the next experiments (>600 ms) are likely
to result from the dual-task situation. Consistent with this conjecture, we recently
showed that when subjects had to respond to both the target and prime (as in the
present experiments), RTs were on the order of 650 ms, whereas when they had
to respond only to the target (all other things being identical), their RTs fell below
400 ms (Peremen and Lamy, 2014).
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FIGURE 3 | Proportion of trials in each level of prime visibility (0–3) as a function of the SOA between the prime and target, in Experiment 1.
Table 1 | Mean reaction times and accuracy on congruent and on
incongruent trials in Experiment 1 as a function of visibility rating.
Reaction times (ms) Accuracy (%)
Visibility Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
0 606.2 655.6 98.7 97.8
1 640.9 683.8 99.0 98.2
2 693.7 746.2 98.0 98.2
3 653.5 747.3 97.0 95.9
FIGURE 4 | Mean response-priming effect in milliseconds in
Experiment 1, as a function of visibility rating. Priming was signiﬁcant
for visibility 0–3. Error bars represent standard errors. *p < 0.002.
controlled by a Power Samsung 3D PC. In order to create stereo-
scopic perception the stimuli were viewed through SSG-M3150GB
3D Active Glasses (battery powered), which let one image through
the left eye while blocking stimulation to the right eye and another
image to the right eye while blocking stimulation to the left eye,
with a 60-Hz alternation rhythm that is beyond the perceptual
threshold. The target display was presented together with the
Mondrian suppressors to one eye, whereas the prime display was
displayed to the other (“suppressed”) eye.
Sample displays are presented in Figure 5. The prime display
consisted of two ﬁlled horizontal arrows (1.72◦ × 0.46◦ each)
pointing in the same direction, either left or right, and presented
0.57◦ above and below the center of the screen. The two prime
arrows were gray and appeared at variable contrast levels of 20,
60, or 100% of maximum contrast level (RGB 195, 195, 195).
The target display consisted of a horizontal white outline arrow
(1.72◦× 0.57◦) pointing either leftward or rightward. All arrows
were presented against a black background. The suppressors were
Mondrians, that is, randomly colored ﬁgures of partly overlapping
rectangles of varying sizes and colors. A white rectangular frame
(18.16◦ × 18.16◦) centered at ﬁxation was presented to each eye
throughout the trial.
Each trial began with a 1,000-ms presentation of the ﬁxation
display. The prime display was then faded in by ramping up its
contrast from 0% to a contrast level of 20, 60, or 100% in 200 ms.
It remained on the screen until the target was presented, following
a variable SOA (250, 350, 450, 550, or 650 ms). The target display
remained visible until response. The subsequent events as well as
the response requirements were the same as in Experiment 1.
The two prime arrows and the target arrow were equally likely
to point to the left or right, and were therefore equally likely to be
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FIGURE 5 | Sequence of events in Experiment 2. The prime arrows
were gradually introduced and presented to one eye (suppressed
eye), while the target was superimposed on a dynamic Mondrian
and presented to the other eye (non-suppressed eye). Here, the
directions of the prime and target arrows are incongruent.
Participants were required to make a speeded response to the
target arrow direction (left or right) and then rate subjective visibility
of the prime.
congruent or incongruent. Conditions of prime-arrows direction,
target-arrow direction, SOA and prime contrast were randomly
mixed.
RESULTS
In all RT analyses, trials in which responses to the target arrow
direction were inaccurate were excluded (1.2%) and so were trials
in which the RT exceeded the mean of its cell by more than 2.5
SDs (fewer than 1.6% of the trials).
An ANOVA with SOA and prime-contrast level as within-
subject factors and mean visibility as the dependent variable
revealed signiﬁcant main effects, F(4,56) = 18.51, p < 0.0001
and F(2,28) = 17.16, p < 0.0001, respectively, with higher
visibility as the SOA and prime-contrast increased. The sig-
niﬁcant interaction between these factors, F(8,112) = 4.87,
p < 0.002 indicated that the effect of prime contrast became
signiﬁcant only for SOAs exceeding 350 ms. The mean pro-
portions of trials per visibility is shown in Figure 6 as a func-
tion of SOA and in Figure 7 as a function of prime-contrast
level.
Reaction times
A linear mixed-effects model with visibility (0, 1, 2, or 3),
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), prime-contrast level
(20, 60, 100%) and SOA (250, 350, 450, 550, or 650 ms) as
within-subject factors was performed on the mean RTs of correct
trials. The main effect of SOA was signiﬁcant, F(4,56) = 22.95,
p < 0.0001 with slower RTs as SOA increased and did not inter-
act with congruency, F < 1. There was no signiﬁcant effect
of prime contrast F(2,28) = 1.99, p = 0.16, and no interac-
tion involving this factors, all Fs < 1. Mean RTs and accuracy
data are presented in Table 2 and the mean congruency effect
at each visibility level is shown in Figure 8. The main effect
of congruency was signiﬁcant, F(1,14) = 41.39, p < 0.0001
with faster RTs when the directions of the prime and target
arrows were congruent than when they were incongruent. The
main effect of visibility was also signiﬁcant, F(3,40) = 104.28,
p < 0.0001, indicating that RTs were slower for 0- than for
1-, 2- and 3-visibility trials, all ps < 0.0002. There was a sig-
niﬁcant interaction between the two factors, F(3,38) = 8.04,
p < 0.0003. Further analyses revealed that the congruency effect
was signiﬁcant for visibility levels 1, 2 and 3, F(1,38) = 5.06,
p < 0.03, F(1,38) = 12.6, p < 0.001 and F(1,38) = 45.12,
p < 0.001, respectively but crucially and unlike the pattern of
results observed in Experiment 1, response priming was not
signiﬁcant when visibility was null, F < 1. As is clear from
Figure 8 response priming increased linearly with increasing levels
of visibility.
Accuracy
Similar analyses conducted on the accuracy data showed similar
trends. The main effect of visibility was signiﬁcant, F(3,37) = 3.82,
p< 0.02. No effect involving congruency approached signiﬁcance,
all ps> 0.2.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 revealed a markedly differ-
ent pattern. When the prime was invisible, response priming
was signiﬁcant when invisibility was achieved using meta-contrast
masking (Experiment 1), but was absent when invisibility was
achieved using CFS (Experiment 2). These ﬁndings suggest that
CFS interferes with processing more deeply than does meta-
contrast masking. However, four alternative accounts must be
considered.
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FIGURE 6 | Proportion of trials in each level of prime visibility (0–3) as a function of the SOA between the prime and target, in Experiment 2.
FIGURE 7 | Proportion of trials in each level of prime visibility (0–3) as a function of prime contrast level, in Experiment 2.
Table 2 | Mean reaction times and accuracy on congruent and on
incongruent trials in Experiment 2 as a function of visibility rating.
Reaction times (ms) Accuracy (%)
Visibility Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
0 685.5 689.3 99.5 99.0
1 757.1 779.5 99.0 97.7
2 750.4 791.1 99.5 96.4
3 697.7 746.5 99.2 97.9
First, although the stimuli used were largely similar in the two
experiments, they differed in a few respects. For instance, the
prime was one central arrow in Experiment 1 and two eccentric
(albeit foveal) arrows in Experiment 2. Although stimulus-related
differences should not matter as long as the primes are liminal
to the same extent, one could claim that there might be qualita-
tive differences in unconscious processing of central and eccentric
stimuli.
Second, when the prime was clearly visible (visibility 3),
response priming was larger in the meta-contrast than in the
CFS experiment (93 vs. 49 ms, respectively). Thus, it may be
the case that the meta-contrast masking paradigm yielded larger
response priming overall in our experiment and was therefore
more sensitive for detecting unconscious processing than was the
CFS paradigm. In order to test this possibility, we analyzed the data
from participants who showed the largest response priming effects
for maximum visibility in the CFS experiment (i.e., with response
priming exceeding the median effect of the group, 57 ms). The
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FIGURE 8 | Mean response-priming effect in milliseconds in
Experiment 2, as a function of visibility rating. Priming was signiﬁcant
for visibility 1, 2, and 3, but not when visibility was null. Error bars
represent standard errors. *p < 0.03.
mean congruency effect for visibility-3 trials in large-response-
priming participants was 78 ms, and was therefore similar to the
mean congruency effect in Experiment 1 (93 ms). Yet, response
priming when the prime was invisible remained null (4 ms, F < 1).
Conversely, we analyzed the data from participants who showed
the smallest response priming effects for maximum visibility in the
meta-contrast masking experiment (i.e., response priming effect
lower than the median effect of the group, 75 ms). The mean
congruency effect for visibility-3 trials in small-response-priming
participants was 54 ms, and was therefore similar to the mean
congruency effect in Experiment 2 (49 ms). Yet, in line with our
prediction, response priming was still highly signiﬁcant when the
prime was invisible [75 ms, F(1,23) = 21.86, p < 0.0001]. We
can thus conclude that differences in the magnitudes of response
priming on high-visibility trials does not account for the observed
differences in unconscious processing between the two methods.
Third, as the distribution of trials across visibility levels varied
as a function of SOA (Figure 6) and prime contrast (Figure 7),
our ﬁnding of a large congruency effect when the prime was vis-
ible (ratings 1, 2, and 3) but not when it was invisible (rating 0)
may reﬂect SOA- or prime-contrast- rather than visibility-related
differences. In other words, the null response priming effect on
0-visibility trials may mainly emanate from short-SOA or low-
prime-contrast trials, whereas the large response priming effect
on visibility-3 trials may mainly emanate from long-SOA or high-
prime-contrast trials (note that this problem does not apply to
Experiment 1 because priming was found for visibility 0). The
fact that the congruency effect interacted with neither SOA nor
contrast level is inconsistent with such a claim, yet we neverthe-
less conducted additional analyses to examine this possibility. We
focused only on the SOA (250 ms) and prime-contrast level (20%)
for which visibility three ratings were least frequent. The congru-
ency effect was still present for visibility-3 trials, F(1,32) = 3.58,
p < 0.07 and F(1,32) = 4.93, p < 0.04, for the 250-ms SOA and
20%- prime contrast, respectively, and still absent for visibility-0
trials, both Fs< 1.
The fourth alternative account rests on the observation that
the proportion of 0-visibility trials was overall larger in the CFS
than in the meta-contrast experiment. The lowest proportion of
such trials was 44% (with the 650-ms SOA) in the former, whereas
the highest proportion in the latter experiment was 37% (with
the 47-ms SOA). As explained in the introduction, such a state
of affairs indicates that the prime stimuli were further from the
limenof consciousness in theCFS than in themeta-contrast exper-
iment, which could explain why we failed to observe unconscious
processing with CFS.
Although the additional analyses reported above provide a
partial answer to the second and third issues, the objective of
Experiment 3 was to address all four issues more directly.
EXPERIMENT 3
In this experiment, we again used CFS to manipulate conscious
perception of the prime but introduced three changes in order
to test our conclusions from Experiment 2 against alternative
accounts. First, the prime and target arrows were now identical
to those used in Experiment 1, so as to preclude any account
based on stimulus-based differences between the meta-contrast
and CFS experiments. Second, to ensure that the unconscious
and conscious conditions were physically identical, we used only
one contrast level and one prime-target SOA. Third, we selected a
high prime-contrast level and ramped it up faster than in Exper-
iment 2 in order to bring the prime stimulus to a closer distance
to the limen. Speciﬁcally, we aimed at obtaining a percentage of
0-visibility trials similar or smaller than for the SOA associated
with the highest such percentage in the meta-contrast experiment
(47 ms), in which a signiﬁcant priming effect was observed.
Note that while we physically equated the prime and target
stimuli in Experiments 3 and 1, we used different SOAs (from
0 to 118 ms in Experiment vs. 200 ms in Experiment 3). Obvi-
ously, stimulus conditions to prevent consciousness are going
to be different in any two methods, in order for these meth-
ods to be distinguished: had we used exactly the same stimuli
and SOAs in the CFS as in the meta-contrast experiments, prime
stimuli would have suffered from both meta-contrast masking
and CFS. Consistent with this observation, it is noteworthy than
none of the previous studies which compared CFS and back-
ward masking used identical stimuli or temporal parameters.
For instance, Faivre et al. (2012) presented the critical primes
for 2,500 ms with CFS and for 50 ms with backward masking.
Likewise, Almeida et al. (2010) presented their primes twice for
100 ms in the CFS condition and once for 35 ms in the back-
ward masking condition. However, in Experiment 3, in order to
minimize the potential consequences of using long prime dura-
tions with CFS, we selected a relatively short SOA, namely, 200 ms,
which ensured that no meta-contrast masking could occur (e.g.,
Enns, 2004). If the ﬁndings of Experiment 2 resulted from gen-
uine differences between CFS and meta-contrast masking rather
than from any of the four alternative accounts we suggested
then we should expect to replicate these ﬁndings in the present
experiment.
METHODS
Participants
Thirteen undergraduate students from Tel Aviv University (12
right-handed, eightwomen), age 20–28 years (M = 24.0, SD= 2.4)
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FIGURE 9 | Sequence of events in Experiment 3. Prime-to-target SOA was ﬁxed at 200 ms and prime contrast level also ﬁxed.
were tested in one session for course credit or for a 30-NIS pay
(∼8USD). All subjects reported normal or corrected-to-normal
vision.
Apparatus, stimuli, procedure, and design
The apparatus, stimuli, procedure and design were the same as
in Experiment 2 except for the following changes. First, the prime
and mask arrows were exactly the same as in Experiment 1. Sample
displays are presented in Figure 9. Second, prime contrast was not
manipulated: on each trial, the prime display was faded in by
ramping up its contrast to 100% of maximum contrast level in
50 ms. Finally, the target display followed the prime after a ﬁxed
SOA of 200 ms.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The data from one participant was excluded from analysis because
upon debrieﬁng, he reported using the strategy of foveating the
periphery of the display, which helped him perceive the prime
more easily. Prime-absent (or catch) trials as well as no-go tri-
als were excluded from all analyses. In all RT analyses, trials in
which responses to the target arrow direction were inaccurate were
excluded (1.9%) and so were trials in which the RT exceeded the
mean of its cell by more than 2.5 SDs (fewer than 2.4% of the
trials). The mean proportions of trials per visibility are shown in
Figure 10.
Reaction times
A linear mixed-effects model with visibility (0, 1, 2, or 3)
and prime-target congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) as
within-subject factors was performed on the mean RTs of
correct trials. Mean RTs are presented in Table 3 and the
mean congruency effect at each visibility level is shown in
Figure 11. The main effect of congruency was signiﬁcant,
F(1,11) = 159.26, p < 0.0001, with faster RTs when the direc-
tions of the prime and target arrows were congruent than
when they were incongruent. The main effect of visibility
was also signiﬁcant, F(3,33) = 12.83, p < 0.0001, indicat-
ing that RTs became slower as mean visibility ratings increased.
There was a signiﬁcant interaction between the two factors,
F(3,32) = 24.74, p < 0.0001. Closely replicating the ﬁndings
of Experiment 2, the congruency effect increased as visibility
FIGURE 10 | Proportion of trials for each level of prime visibility (0–3) in
Experiment 3.
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Table 3 | Mean reaction times and accuracy on congruent and on
incongruent trials in Experiment 3 as a function of visibility rating.
Reaction times (ms) Accuracy (%)
Visibility Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent
0 669.3 675.2 99.1 98.8
1 653.2 689.8 99.3 98.9
2 672.8 712.0 99.2 99.0
3 654.2 736.6 98.8 98.2
FIGURE 11 | Mean response-priming effect in milliseconds in
Experiment 3, as a function of visibility rating. Priming was signiﬁcant
for visibility 1, 2, and 3, but not when visibility was null. Error bars
represent standard errors. *p < 0.001.
increased and was signiﬁcant for visibility levels 1, 2, and 3,
F(1,32) = 33.0, p < 0.001, F(1,32) = 31.19, p < 0.001, and
F(1,32) = 147.74, p < 0.001, respectively. Crucially, however,
it was again non signiﬁcant when visibility was null, F = 1.03,
p = 0.32.
Accuracy
Similar analyses were conducted on the accuracy data. The con-
gruency effect was not signiﬁcant, F(1,11) = 2.25, p = 0.16 and
neither were all other effects, all Fs< 1.
The results replicated the ﬁndings of Experiment 2, yet they
can be accounted for by none of alternative interpretations
raised with respect to Experiment 2. In particular, the mag-
nitude of response priming on maximum-visibility trials was
similar to the one observed with meta-contrast masking (Exper-
iment 1). In addition, the proportion of null-visibility trials was
smaller in this experiment than in Experiment 2 and was now
similar to the proportion observed in the meta-contrast exper-
iment. In fact, this proportion was smaller here (31.2%) than
with the 24 and 47-ms SOAs (32.6 and 36.7%, respectively),
for which signiﬁcant response priming was observed in Experi-
ment 1. Thus, the stimuli were unlikely to be further from the
limen of consciousness in the CFS relative to the meta-contrast
experiment.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this study, we compared unconscious processing under meta-
contrast masking and CFS. Conscious perception was assessed
using a sensitive visibility scale ranging from 0 to 3 and uncon-
scious processing was measured as a signiﬁcant effect of the
congruency between the directions of a prime and target arrows
when participants reported not seeing the prime at all (i.e., when
its visibility was rated to be 0). The central ﬁnding is that uncon-
scious processing was substantial with meta-contrast masking but
absent with CFS.
Although previous studies have also compared different sup-
pression methods and shown that CFS allows only little uncon-
scious processing, it is important to report conceptual replications
of these ﬁndings on the backdrop of the increasing popularity
of CFS as a tool to study unconscious processing. We extend
previous ﬁndings by comparing CFS to meta-contrast mask-
ing rather than pattern backward masking or gaze-contingent
crowding, and by probing unconscious response priming that
relies on simple shape perception, rather than semantic cate-
gory discrimination or emotional processing (Almeida et al., 2010
and Faivre et al., 2012, respectively). In addition, our compar-
ison involved exactly the same prime and target stimuli unlike
Almeida et al. (2010) who added 70% of noise to the prime
stimuli in the masking but not in the CFS experiment and
Faivre et al. (2012) study who cropped peripheral facial attributes
(e.g., hair, ears) in the masking but not in the CFS experiment.
Finally and most importantly, we used a novel methodology to
ensure that the critical stimuli were at a comparable distance
from the limen of consciousness during CFS and meta-contrast
masking.
COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS CFS STUDIES
The ﬁnding that CFS disrupts relatively low-level perceptual pro-
cesses calls for a reappraisal of previous demonstrations that highly
complex processing can be performed when conscious perception
of the critical stimuli is prevented using CFS. Therefore, our study
accredits the notion that unconscious processing demonstrated by
measuring the time of breaking of CFS suppression (e.g., Jiang
et al., 2006; Costello et al., 2009; Mudrik et al., 2011; Sklar et al.,
2012; Lupyan and Ward, 2013) resulted from partial awareness of
the suppressed stimuli (e.g., Stein et al., 2011; Gayet et al., 2014).
However, our results appear to be at odds with previous reports of
unconscious priming during CFS.
Bahrami et al. (2010) examined whether invisible numerical
stimuli could prime a visible numerical target. They measured
subjective awareness on a scale ranging from 0 to 2 on each
trial and reported a signiﬁcant effect of the numerical distance
between the prime and target on 0-prime-visibility trials. How-
ever, unconscious numerical processing was very tenuous. The
priming effect, measured as the RT-difference between prime-
present and prime-absent trials, was found to depend on the
identity of the prime only for one speciﬁc prime-target distance:
RTs were faster for same than for different prime-target trials only
for the prime-target distance of -2 (and not for distances of -1, 1,
and 2).
Almeida et al. (2010) reported a small (<15 ms), yet sig-
niﬁcant category-speciﬁc priming effect for tool vs. animal
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stimuli with invisible primes. CFS-suppressed stimuli were held
to be invisible based on an awareness pre-test which deter-
mined the individual stimulus contrast for which participants
were at chance at discriminating the prime category. This stim-
ulus contrast was used in the main experiment. Two aspects
of this procedure, however, suggest that partial awareness
may have occurred. First, the awareness-check block was run
before the experimental trials, so that participants were more
practiced for trials in which priming was measured than for
trials in which conscious perception was assessed. As per-
ception of the prime is likely to increase with practice (e.g.,
Schwiedrzik et al., 2009), partial awareness of the prime cannot
be excluded. In addition, the authors adopted a rather lenient
criterion for consciousness: forced-choice discrimination perfor-
mance ranging between 35 and 65% was held to reﬂect chance
performance.
Faivre et al. (2012) reported unconscious priming elicited
by CFS-suppressed faces. A signiﬁcant improvement over pre-
vious study is that priming and conscious perception were
measured under exactly the same conditions. The ﬁnding of
Faivre et al.’s (2012) study is not necessarily incompatible with
our results, however. While we found no priming for prime
and target arrows that were physically different from each
other, Faivre et al. (2012) reported priming in the form of
a performance cost when the prime and target were identi-
cal, suggesting that sensory adaptation may have occurred. By
contrast, they found that the same faces did not bias affec-
tive judgments of a subsequent neutral target. Taken together,
these ﬁndings suggest that CFS suppression may allow very
low-level perceptual processing of the prime but not response
priming. Further research is required to further test this
hypothesis.
Finally, Izatt et al. (2014) provided only weak evidence of
unconscious priming by CFS-suppressed faces. First, their stim-
uli were considered to be invisible when subjects reported either
no experience or a brief glimpse of the stimulus, that is, in
conditions that are equivalent to visibility levels 0 and 1 of the
present study. Considering that we found unconscious prim-
ing to be signiﬁcant for visibility 1 (but not for null visibility),
any unconscious priming demonstrated when these two visibil-
ity levels are collapsed may have resulted from partial awareness.
Second, one could infer that unconscious priming occurred
during CFS only from the fact that unconscious priming was
signiﬁcant across masking conditions (backward masking and
CFS) and did not interact with masking technique. Thus, there
was no direct test of unconscious priming by CFS-suppressed
stimuli.
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF UNCONSCIOUS
PROCESSING
Our ﬁndings show that in the search for the boundaries of
unconscious processing, the method used to prevent con-
scious perception matters: failure to observe that some pro-
cess can be performed without conscious perception with one
method does not necessarily entail that conscious percep-
tion is necessary for this process. In the present study, for
instance, identiﬁcation of the prime shape and activation of
the motor response associated with this shape were found to
be largely independent of conscious perception: priming was
of the same magnitude when the prime was subjectively invis-
ible, barely visible or almost clearly visible (although priming
was further boosted when visibility was maximal). Yet, had
one relied on the ﬁndings resulting from preventing conscious
perception using CFS, the conclusion would have been that
shape processing and/or motor preparation require conscious
perception.
It follows that the best-suited methods to study unconscious
processing are those that can entirely prevent conscious per-
ception while minimally disrupting unconscious processing. In
order to uncover such methods, different means of suppressing
conscious vision must be compared. We suggest that such com-
parison is possible only if one ensures that the critical stimuli
are equally close to the limen of consciousness for each of the
compared methods. (Here, we deﬁned conscious perception at
the most basic level, namely, with regard to perception of the
critical stimulus’ mere presence rather than with regard to per-
ception of one of its features). We further suggest that a fruitful
approach to measure distance from the limen is to use stim-
ulus and temporal parameters that are associated with liminal
perception and to assess conscious perception using a sensitive
subjective scale. In this way, the distance from the limen can be
estimated as the percentage of 0-visibility trials6. Again, it should
be noted that objective measures of conscious perception can-
not provide an estimate of such distance, as explained in the
introduction. Here, we showed that although stimuli rendered
invisible using CFS and meta-contrast masking (Experiment 1
vs. 3) were equally distant from the limen and produced sim-
ilar priming effects for maximum visibility trials, unconscious
response priming was large with one method and absent with
the other.
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